We experimentally investigate how much value people put in observable information about others in strategic interactions. The incentivized experimental task is to predict an unknown target player's trustworthiness in an earlier hidden action game. In Experiment 1, we vary the source of information about the target player (neutral picture, neutral video, video containing strategic content). The observed prediction accuracy rates then serve as an empirical measure of the objective value of information. In Experiment 2, we elicit the subjective value of information using the standard stated preferences method ("willingness to accept"). While the elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective ones, subjects attach value to information which does not help predict target behavior, and exaggerate the value of helpful information.
Introduction
Notwithstanding standard theoretical predictions, economic cooperation often emerges among strangers facing adverse individual incentives (Camerer, 2003) . Importantly, although observable information about people's physical characteristics may constitute a strategic asset in social interactions, not all sources of information are equally useful.
On the one hand, the presence of strategic content may improve prediction accuracy. Verplaetse et al. (2007) report that loaded pictures (grasping the facial expression at the very moment of the decision making in the game) are more helpful in predicting cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game than the ones taken in a neutral setting. In a related experiment, Sylwester et al. If observable information has the capacity to foster eciency of human interactions, it also bears an objective economic value. In the context of a trust game experiment, Eckel and Petrie (2011) show that many people exhibit a preference (which generates economic demand) for acquiring this kind of information about interaction partners. The central question we are asking in this paper is: To what extent do these preferences reect the actual value of information? Existing evidence, albeit scarce, suggests that people do not eciently distinguish between more and less valuable sources of observable information. In the aforementioned paper, Bonnefon et al. (2013) show that once given a direct choice, people predominantly favor the source of information with a lower objective value (i.e., a passport-style picture instead of a cropped one). Similar evidence is provided by Tsay (2013) in a non-strategic setting. She investigates people's (novices as well as experts) ability to predict how well piano players performed in a professional contest. Comparing three dierent sources of information either purely auditory, or purely visual, or a combination of both, she reports that looking at the musicians' performance overrides listening to their music, as well as having both sources of information combined. However, despite its relatively low objective value, the latter source happens to be chosen by the vast majority of subjects. Note, however, that in these two studies the preferred sources of information also happen to be the richest ones, so that the presence of confounding non-strategic motives (like mere curiosity, or more broadly the hedonic value of observable information) cannot be excluded.
In the present study, we use the classic thin slice paradigm in a novel design to investigate whether people rationally value observable information, i.e. whether the subjective value of information is aligned with its objective value. We experimentally implement a prediction task in which subjects determine whether a target person was trustworthy or not as a trustee in an earlier hidden action game with one-way, pre-play communication. Our treatments vary the sources of observable information about the target person. Our empirical strategy requires a variation in the prediction accuracy (and thus, the objective value of information) across treatments. To achieve this, Experiment 1 implements a set of distinct sources of information that dier along the two dimensions outlined in the previous paragraph: the richness of cues (neutral picture, henceforth PHOTO vs. neutral video, henceforth VIDNE), and the presence of strategic content (loaded video, henceforth VIDLO, showing a pre-play statement the target person made in front of other players in the hidden action game). We demonstrate that the resulting prediction accuracy systematically varies across the three conditions: PHOTO and VIDNE generate signicantly lower prediction accuracy than VIDLO. We then assess the extent to which the subjective value of information (measured in Experiment 2) is aligned with its objective value. Importantly, our design rules out the presence of any non-strategic confounds such that the subjective value of information (elicited in an incentivized way through a standard willingness to accept procedure) stems solely from its perceived usefulness in the prediction task. Notwithstanding the previous ndings, our data point to a consistent valuation of observable information in a strategic setting: The elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective values. However, we also document important misperceptions of the objective value of information. First, subjects attach value even to those sources of information that are not helpful in predicting target behavior. Second, the perceived value of helpful information is substantially overstated. Background data for the prediction task in Experiments 1 and 2. For implementing the prediction task, we use the dataset previously reported in Babutsidze et al. (2019) . That study is based on the hidden action game by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) presented in Figure 1 .
All payos are in Euros. The game is played between two parties: the trustor and the trustee.
The trustor may either choose an outside option Out which yields 5 to both players and ends the interaction, or go In. Then, the trustee may either choose to Roll a die (which yields 12 to the trustor and 10 to the trustee with the probability of 5/6, and 0 to the trustor and 10 to the trustee with the probability of 1/6), or not to Roll (yielding 0 to the trustor and 14 to the trustee with certainty). This game provides a simple setting for studying cooperation in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard: incentives are not aligned between the two parties, and earning 0 5 is not perfectly informative for the trustor about the trustee's action.
Like Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), we simultaneously elicit both players' decisions. Namely, the trustee makes a decision without knowing the trustor's move, and that decision is only implemented had the trustor gone In. The game is preceded by a pre-play stage with face-to-face communication and is implemented as follows. In every experimental session, six trustors are seated in one room (in separate cubicles and without a possibility to communicate) where they make all their decisions in the game. Each of the six trustees, in turn, makes an individual decision in a separate room. Prior to the decision-making stage of the game, each trustee is given approximately two minutes to prepare a short statement for the trustors. At this point, we provide an additional set of instructions emphasizing the fact that the statement may aect the trustors' decisions and, consequently, the trustee's gain from the experiment. 4 Each time, a trustee is randomly drawn without replacement from the main sample of 41 observations. A correct (an incorrect) prediction is worth 10 (2) euros, no feedback is provided from one prediction to the other, and two rounds out of twenty are randomly drawn for payo at the end of each experimental session. Note that unlike some previous studies using the better than chance paradigm, we do not constrain the base rate of success at the chance level of 50%. 5 Our experimental treatments are implemented in a betweensubject manner and progressively enrich the set of information about the trustee that is provided to the subject prior to making a prediction: either a mugshot picture (PHOTO; N = 44), or a neutral video recording (with sound) showing that person making a non-strategic statement that has been recorded before (and independently of ) the experimental hidden action game (VIDNE; 2 There were seven experimental sessions in total, each having six trustors and six trustees. However, as explained in the Appendix A, the data for one trustee are incomplete and had to withdrawn from the analysis. 3 Like Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), we dene a promise as a statement of intent to Roll. Our classication method echoes the recent study by Schwartz et al. (2018) . All statements were classied as promises or nopromises by two independent coders (research assistants). The rst coder classied the content of messages while preparing the transcripts of player Bs' statements. Then, another coder received the full list of 41 transcripts and independently classied each of them. Ties were broken by one of the authors. The resulting conditional likelihoods of Roll following a promise vs. without a promise to Roll equal 71.4% vs. 50%. 4 Due to minor technical glitches in the laboratory visual content not being displayed properly, or sound being muted we lost the data from 4 individual predictions (involving 3 subjects) in VIDLO and 8 individual predictions (involving 6 subjects) in VIDNE. Since for those few individuals the ultimate number of predictions is below 20, there are marginal dierences between the aggregate accuracy rates reported in Figure 2a and the average individual accuracy rates outlined in Figure 2b and Table 1 . 5 Under the better than chance paradigm, subjects typically receive randomly generated pairs of stimuli one coming from a person that exhibited certain behavior, and one from another person that did not (which is common knowledge; see, e.g., This hypothesis implies the following ordering of the prediction accuracy rates across the experimental treatments: VIDLO > VIDNE ≈ PHOTO.
On a nal note, our design makes the acquaintance between the experimental subjects in Lyon and the trustees recorded in Nice unlikely, so that one may plausibly assume that performance in the prediction task actually measures the individual capacity to detect cooperativeness in strangers.
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Design of Experiment 2. The second experiment (N = 145; 84 females; average age of 20.87, SD 1.57) is based on the one-shot version of the prediction task used in the rst experiment.
We rely on the stated preferences approach to eliciting participants' subjective valuation of the dierent sources of information. We use a within-subject design to elicit individual willingness 8 method is incentive-compatible (i.e., it provides incentives for a truthful revelation of certainty equivalent, henceforth CE) and runs as follows.
In the rst step, we ask each subject to state a certainty equivalent (between 21 and 100 points, with a conversion rate of 1 point=0.10 euro) they would be willing to accept for not having to make a prediction in each of our three main environments of interest, i.e. PHOTO, VIDNE, VIDLO, as well as an additional environment where no specic information is available about the trustee from the previous hidden action game (NOINF). 8 The NOINF condition grasps the subjective value of the prediction task per se (i.e., with no additional information about the trustee) which we use as a baseline for estimating the subjective value of the additional information provided in PHOTO, VIDNE, and VIDLO conditions. Note that the participants are only provided a short description of the kind of information provided in each of the four environments, but do not inspect any specic content at this point. 9 We see this feature of our experiment as an additional layer of complexity which, if anything, makes it harder to the subjects to correctly assess the actual value of information. Thus, this part of our design keeps our experimental testbed for rational valuation of observable information on the conservative side.
In the second step, one of the four environments is chosen at random. The computer also generates a uniform random number between 20 and 99. If the CE corresponding to the randomly chosen environment exceeds the number randomly generated by the computer, then the subject is asked to inspect the informational content (if any) of a given environment, and then to make a prediction.
10 Otherwise, the subject earns an amount of points (later converted into euros) equal to the random number, and asked to inspect the informational content without making any prediction. Hence, in stark contrast to the previous experiments (Bonnefon et al., 2013;
Tsay, 2013), in our experiment subjects do not directly choose the source of information (which is exogenously determined by the computer), and are always given the opportunity to inspect its content regardless of whether it is part of the incentivized prediction task or not. Thus, 8 The range of CE is dened by the payo scheme in the prediction task 20 points for an incorrect prediction, and 100 points for a correct one. 9 This element of our design diers from Bonnefon et al. (2013) who provide exemplary samples prior to letting subjects choose the source of information. 10 For PHOTO, VIDNE and VIDLO, the prediction-making procedure is analogous to a single round in Experiment 1. 9 our design guarantees that the stated preferences reect the strategic value of information in a prediction exercise rather than any other confounding motives (such as the prediction-maker's curiosity about the target person). We can make the following hypothesis:
The stated preferences for observable information are aligned with its empirical value in the prediction task, so that the elicited subjective values run in the following order:
VIDLO>VIDNE≈PHOTO.
Between these two steps (and without prior notice), we also elicit subject's beliefs about the prediction accuracy rates previously observed in Experiment 1. This procedure is based on the Most Likely Interval (MLI) elicitation rule due to Schlag and van der Weele (2015). For each of the three conditions, the participant is asked how many predictions out of 100 were accurate, and to choose one of the following intervals: ±5, ±10, or ±15. The task is incentivized as follows.
An answer is considered as correct if the actual prediction accuracy rate from Experiment 1 lies within the chosen band from the stated belief. A participant is only rewarded for providing three correct answers (i.e., a correct answer for each of three conditions). Giving three correct answers with interval ±5 is worth 10 euros, and whenever interval ±10 (±15) is chosen instead of ±5, this amount decreases by 1.50 (3) euros.
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Importantly, the rich information on individual heterogeneity (beliefs about the prediction accuracy rates in Experiment 1, the degree of condence in those beliefs, as well as individual risk preferences see the experimental procedures below) allows us to advance our investigation of stated preferences for information beyond the plain ordinal scope of Hypothesis 2. We focus on (i) We note that the underlying assumption behind Hypothesis 3b is that the empirical value of information is indeed objective, so that one's beliefs about the empirical value of information coincide with one's beliefs about the value of that information for oneself. This may not be the case if, for instance, someone considers him or herself better than average in reading human faces. Since our dataset does not contain information about one's relative condence in one's own abilities in the experimental task, our experimental design does not suce to test the validity of this assumption. We acknowledge this is a caveat for the empirical analysis that follows. 13
Experimental procedures. Upon arriving to the lab, subjects are seated in individual cubicles and informed about the general rules of a lab experiment. 14 The preliminary part of the session consists of a basic socio-demographic questionnaire (age, gender, education, major, current occupation, score at the baccalauréat exam at the end of high school), as well as a set of (moderately) incentivized and non-incentivized computerized tasks designed to measure specic individual characteristics. 15 After that, subjects receive paper instructions describing the details of the previous hidden action game experiment, as well as their own experimental task. Those instructions are read aloud by the experimenter, any remaining questions are immediately answered, and the experiment moves to its main stage, as described above. In addition to earnings in the experimental 13 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 14 A complete set of experimental instructions (translated from French to English) can be found in Appendix B. 
Results
The goal of the rst experiment is to estimate the objective value of the dierent sources of information in the experimental prediction task (testing Hypothesis 1). In the second experiment, we elicit the subjective value of those sources of information using the standard stated preferences approach (willingness to accept). The treatment eects on the experimental variables are evaluated using standard parametric and nonparametric methods. As a robustness check, in Appendix D we report Bayes factors associated with the main comparisons of interest. Our main nding is that the elicited values and beliefs are aligned with the objective value of information (Hypotheses 2 and 3 are thus conrmed).
Experiment 1: the objective value of information
We rst draw a statistical link between the predicted behavior and the actual behavior depending on the source observable information by testing Hypothesis 1. Let p R (p DR ) be the likelihood of making a prediction Roll conditional on the target person actually choosing to Roll (Don't roll ).
p R = p DR implies that subjects are unable to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy target players, and make a prediction Roll at a constant rate (freely ranging between 0 and 1) irrespective of the trustee's underlying type. p R > p DR , in turn, implies that subjects do distinguish between target players' types and are more likely to make a prediction Roll for those who actually rolled a die in the hidden action game. 16 Following this intuition, for each treatment we regress an indicator variable 1[P redictionRoll] (set to 1 if one predicts that the target person rolled a die in the previous experiment, and to 0 otherwise) on another indicator variable 1[ActualRoll] (set to 1 if the target person actually rolled a die in the previous experiment, and to 0 otherwise). The intercept (denoted α 0 ) captures the aggregate likelihood of predicting Roll for those trustees that did not actually roll a die (such that α 0 = p DR ). Our key measure of interest is the coecient of the explanatory variable (denoted α 1 ) which captures the extent to which subjects are able to distinguish between those who rolled and those who did not based on a given source of information
The resulting estimates are provided in Table 1 . Coecient α 1 is found to be close to zero and insignicant for PHOTO and VIDNE, suggesting that these sources of information do not suce to distinguish between the two types of trustees. In VIDLO, α 1 is positive and signicant, meaning that the predictions become adjusted to the trustee's actual type. 17 For those data, the Epps-Singleton test (Epps and Singleton, 1986) rejects the null hypothesis of identical distributions when comparing VIDLO with either VIDNE (p = 0.007) or PHOTO (p = 0.014), but does not reject it when comparing VIDNE with PHOTO (p = 0.255). 18 The parametric analysis reported in Table 2 This result yields full support to Hypothesis 1.
To shed more light on the possible reasons for which loaded information is more helpful in the prediction task than the neutral one, we now turn to investigating how the content of the target 
Additional test: shows that the positive eect of a promise on prediction accuracy is statistically signicant. The average marginal eect is estimated at 7.05% with p = 0.045 (see Appendix C). Altogether, these data suggest that a promise to Roll stands out as a component of strategic communication that is capable of reducing the degree of uncertainty about the target player's trustworthiness.
Experiment 2: the subjective value of information
We now move on to testing Hypothesis 2 based on the result of Experiment 2. Figure 3a Table 1 ). ∆W T A X ≡ W T A X −W T A N OIN F is the dierence between one's stated WTA in a given environment with observable information (X is either VIDLO, VIDNE, or PHOTO) and one's WTA in the no-information baseline environment. As noted above, ∆W T A captures the subjects value of receiving additional information provided in PHOTO, VIDNE, and VIDLO conditions. Figure 3b This result yields full support to our Hypothesis 2. 20 Analogous nonparametric sign-rank test also yields p < 0.001. 21 Analogous sign-rank test conrms these ndings, yielding p = 0.109 for the rst comparison and p < 0.001 for the two remaining ones. To gain more insight into the formation of the subjective value of information, we exploit the data on how individuals perceive the empirical eciency of the three sources of information. Finally, we look at the consistency between the stated preferences and the subjective beliefs about the prediction accuracy rates in Experiment 1.
RP i X be the dierence between subject i's WTA under condition X and the subjective expected payo from the prediction task under condition X given i's belief about the accuracy rate in Experiment 1 (q i X ). We interpret RP i X as the risk premium one would be willing to pay to avoid payo uncertainty from making a prediction under condition X. We conjecture that the stonger the risk aversion and the weaker the condence about q i X , the higher the risk premium. combines the two sets of explanatory variables.
The coecients of Model 1 are interpreted as follows. γ 0 is the risk premium for non-riskaverse subjects. Across the three treatment-specic regressions, this coecient is close to zero and insignicant; a joint test of insignicance yields p = 0.678. This means that non-risk-averse subjects do not ask for a risk premium and their WTA corresponds to the belief-based expected payo from the prediction task. For the risk averse subjects (1[RA] = 1), in turn, we estimate the risk premium as a linear function of their degree of risk aversion (captured by GP _I nvest): 22 The SUR specication (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, pp. 209-210) is due to the within-subject design of Experiment 2: for a given model, the residuals coming from the same individual may be correlated across treatments. 23 As mentioned in footnote 12, the Gneezy-Potters task does not allow us to check whether those who invested their whole endowment (42 subjects) are risk neutral or risk seeking. We categorize them as non-risk-averse
(1[RA] = 0). 
The slope coecient γ 2 captures the monotone pattern in which the risk premium in the prediction varies with the degree of risk aversion. Its negative sign suggests that the risk premium increases with the degree of risk aversion: the lower the investment in the Gneezy-Potters lottery task, the higher the estimated risk premium in the prediction task.
24 In particular, the risk premium for by the most risk averse agents (i.e., those who invest zero) is estimated as γ 0 + γ 1 and found to be positive and signicant in all the treatments (p V IDLO = 0.029; p V IDN E < 0.001; p P HOT O = 0.019). It takes the highest value in VIDNE, and the lowest value in VIDLO; a joint test rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of the three risk premia (p = 0.049). At the opposite extreme, the risk premium for the least risk averse subjects (i.e., the who came close to investing their whole endowment 99 out of 100) is estimated as γ 0 + γ 1 + γ 2 × 99 and insignicant across treatments (p V IDLO = 0.712; p V IDN E = 0.071; p P HOT O = 0.406; joint nullity: p = 0.312). We do not reject the null hypothesis that the risk premium demanded by those subjects is the same as the one of non-risk-averse ones (p V IDLO = 0.656; p V IDN E = 0.156; p P HOT O = 0.712; joint test: p = 0.506). 25
The coecients of Model 2, in turn, are found to be jointly insignicant across all the treatments, pointing to a lack of statistical relationship between individual condence in beliefs and risk 24 Although γ2 is only statistically signicant in VIDNE, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of γ2 across the three conditions (p = 0.119), but we do reject their joint nullity (p = 0.027). 25 This exercise involves testing H0 : γ1 + γ2 × 99 = 0.
premium. Finally, Model 3 fully conrms the outcomes of Model 1 while accounting for individual condence.
Result 4 (Subjective valuation and risk aversion) High degree of risk aversion is associated with a positive risk premium: the elicited WTA is signicantly lower than the belief-based expected payo from making a prediction. The risk premium fades away as the degree of risk aversion falls.
Altogether, Hypothesis 3b is supported by our data.
Conclusion
Eckel and Petrie (2011) show that many people exhibit a preference, and thus generate demand, for observable information (e.g., the counterpart's face) in strategic interactions. In this study, we challenge the view that people exhibit irrational preferences for observable information when it comes to detecting other people's trustworthiness. Both our methodology and main result dier from the previous experimental test of preferences for observable information.
Unlike these studies, we use a methodology allowing us to highlight the importance of information (in both objective and subjective terms) for the ability to predict human behavior, while muting any factors that are unrelated to the prediction task (e.g., mere curiosity, or more generally the hedonic value of receiving such information about other people). In this rened setting, we document a general consistency between the main experimental outcomes: the actual value of information in the prediction task, the stated preferences for information, and the elicited 20 beliefs about the actual value of information. Thus, the main part of our experimental ndings suggests that people do not value observable information in strategic interactions as irrationally as previously claimed. However, we also acknowledge the existence of some biases in participants' valuation of observable information in our experiment. First, subjects place value (albeit small) on the two sources of information that do not help identify the target player's type (i.e., neutral photo and neutral video). Bs are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs. The outcome of the game for each pair is based on the payo structure described in Figure 1 and dened by the decision made by trustor after trustee's statement, as well as the decision made by trustee in a private room had the trustor chosen to go In. For the trustee's decision to Roll, the outcome of the die roll is also taken into account.
For the sake of logistics and ecient time management, trustees arrive 30 minutes prior to trustors. First, they are asked to take up several computerized tasks that measure their preferences and characteristics. Then, they are all led to a waiting room. To avoid any communication or subjects overhearing what others are saying or doing, each participant is seated in a separate cubicle, puts on a headphone and listens to a classical music until further notice. Then, they are taken one by one to a separate room for a mugshot picture and a short, standardized video recording. 27
Then, each subject is seated back in his cubicle with headphones on. He now listens to an audio le containing the experimental instructions (paper version is also provided). There is a brief comprehension quiz assisted by a laboratory sta member. Finally, he receives additional paper instructions about the upcoming statement in front of trustors, as well as a pen and an empty sheet of paper, and is given approximately two minutes to prepare his message. 28 After that, a trustee is invited to trustors' room where he delivers a statement, leaves for another room, and the game proceeds as explain above in Section 2. The average duration of a message is 26.39 seconds (SD 2.09). Trustees' statements are recorded using a small, non-intrusive video camera set up in the middle of trustors' row, right in front or trustees' zone, so that the perspective in the video camera recording resembles the one of a trustor. The camera is always adjusted to the height of trustee (so as to capture head, shoulders, and thorax), and to the luminosity in the room.
The sake of the quality of the video recordings, the background in trustees' zone is covered with light canvas. While making a statement, each trustee also has a portable microphone attached below their face. The distance between trustors and a trustee is set to 2.50 meters.
Upon their arrival to the laboratory, trustors also take up the set of preliminary questionnaires.
Then, they receive and read paper instructions for the experimental game, and nally they ll in a short comprehension quiz. A laboratory sta member then reads aloud all the questions from the quiz along with the corrects answers, and answers any remaining questions. Finally, trustors are asked to wait for the arrival of the rst trustee.
We have conducted 7 sessions. However, one trustee in session 6 decided to quit after the 27 Like in Van Leeuwen et al. (2018), subjects are asked to read neutral content (a short extract from a printer instruction manual) and keep a neutral face expression. The recording takes about 30 seconds. This information is not part of the present investigation and is not reported in the paper. 28 Those additional instructions remind the subject about his role in the game; emphasize the fact that the message may aect trustors' decisions and, consequently, the subject's gain from the experiment; instruct the subject to avoid making a visual or verbal contact with the experimenter, to aim at communicating with all trustors, and not to introduce oneself or give any details about one's own identity.
preliminary measurements and before receiving the instruction of the hidden action game, and was replaced by a research assistant unknown to trustors. To avoid any contamination of trustors' behavior, that research assistant acted as trustee in the nal round of the experimental game. The data from that round were dismissed and our dataset from that session only covers 5 trustees, and thus 41 trustees in total.
A.2 Instructions

A.2.1 Preliminary instructions given to all subjects
You are about to take part in an experiment in which you can earn money. The amount of your gains will depend on your decisions, as well as on the decisions made by other participants. In addition, you will receive a xed fee of [5 for player As, 10 for player Bs ] EUR for completing the experiment. Your total earnings will be paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment.
The experiment consists of several parts. Each part will involve tasks the rules of which will be explained to you in due time. It is crucial that you understand and obey the rules of this experiment. Violation of these rules might result in an exclusion from the experiment and all payments. Please raise your hand whenever you have questions or need assistance.
All the information you provide, as well as the amount of your gains from this experiment, will remain strictly condential and anonymous.
We would now like to ask you to answer a series of preliminary questions. You will answer these questions using the interface on your computer screen. Some of these questions will generate monetary gains. These gains will be determined and added to your overall earnings at the end of the experiment.
Note: the following instructions were given only to player Bs in F2F for the preliminary recordings.
Now, we would like to take a picture and video recoding of you.
First, you will be asked to stand by the wall and look into the camera. Please, try to keep a neutral facial expression.
Second, you will be asked to read aloud the content display on the screen in front of you. While reading, you will be video recorded.
All pictures and video recordings produced during this experiment will only serve strictly scientic purposes of this research project. They may be used in other experimental sessions related to this research project.
A.2.2 Instructions for the hidden action game
Rules of the game
You will now play a game with monetary stakes. The rules of the game are as follows.
The game is played by two players: player A and player B. Each player must choose between two possible actions. Player A chooses between actions Left and Right. Player B chooses whether she want a six-sided die to be rolled (action Roll) or not (action Don't roll).
You will play the role of player [A for player As, B for player Bs ]
Each players' payo depends on the actions chosen by herself as well as the other player:
• if player A chooses Left, then regardless of player Bs' choice:
player A's payo is 5 EUR and player B's payo is 5 EUR;
• if player A chooses Right and player B chooses Don't roll:
29 player A's payo is 0 EUR and player B's payo is 14 EUR;
• if player A chooses Right and player B chooses Roll:
if the number of on the die is between 1 and 5, then player A's payo is 12 EUR and player B's payo is 10 EUR;
if the number of on the die is 6, then player A's payo is 0 EUR and player B's payo is 10 EUR;
How the game proceeds
The game will consist of six identical rounds.
At the beginning of a round, one player B is asked to enter the room in which there are six players
As. Player As are separated one from another and are not allowed to talk.
Player B is then placed in front of player As and remains silent. Then, player B is allowed to talk for no longer than 20 seconds, and then asked to leave player As' room. While talking, player B
is video recorded and should look straight into the camera.
Once player B leaves player As' room: 
Additional information
Note that this set of instructions is provided to and read by each player A and each player B.
Furthermore, player Bs cannot communicate between themselves at any point of the experiment.
The same applies to the communication between player As. provide instruction specic to Experiment 1 and 2, respectively.
B.1 Preliminary instructions given to all subjects in all the treatments
You are about to take part in an experiment in which you can earn money. The amount of your gains will depend on your decisions, as well as on the decisions made by other participants. In addition, you will receive a xed fee of 5 EUR for completing the experiment. Your total earnings will be paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment.
B.2 Specic instructions for Experiment 1
Note: Below, the parts of instructions that are distinct for each treatment are marked with (treatment's name:). Other parts are common to all three treatments.
(PHOTO:) In this part of the experiment, you will see a series of pictures of people.
(VIDLO and VIDNE:) In this part of the experiment, you will watch a series of video recordings.
In each recording, you will see a person making a short statement.
You will be asked to predict the decisions those people previously made in another experiment (the details of which are described below). Your nal gain will depend on the accuracy of your predictions.
The previous experiment
In each session, two groups of participants (six players A and six players B) were installed in two dierent rooms. Participants in each room could not communicate with each other. They all received instructions explaining the rules of the experiment they were about to participate in.
Players were informed that their decisions and earnings would remain private and anonymous, and would never be disclosed to other participants.
Each session was organized as follows:
1. One by one, player Bs entered the room in which players A were sitting. Then, each player B made a short speech in front of player As. Before entering the room, each player B was give a couple of minutes to prepare the statement. Each player B was also informed that his statement could aect player As' decisions and, consequently, his own gain in the experiment.
(VIDLO:) All the statements have been recorded, and you will be watching some of them. This experiment consists of 20 rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will see a picture.
Each picture presents a person in the role of player B from the previous experiment, as described above. The picture was taken privately and independently of the previous experiment.
Then, you will be asked to predict if the player B from the picture decided to roll a die in the previous experiment. Your gain will depend on the accuracy of your prediction: you will earn 10 euros for correct prediction and 2 euros for an incorrect one.
(VIDNE:)
This experiment consists of 20 rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will watch a short video recording (with the sound on).
Each recording presents a person in the role of player B from the previous experiment, as described above. The recording was made privately and independently of the previous experiment.
(VIDLO:)
Each recording presents the statement made by a player B in front of player As during the previous experiment, as described above.
Then, you will be asked to predict if the player B from the recording decided to roll a die in the previous experiment. Your gain will depend on the accuracy of your prediction: you will earn 10 euros for a correct prediction and 2 euros for an incorrect one.
At the end of the experiment, two rounds will be drawn at random. Your nal gain will 34 correspond to the predictions you have made in those two rounds.
B.3 Specic instructions for Experiment 2
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to predict the decisions those people previously made in another experiment (the details of which are described below). Your nal gain will depend on the accuracy of your predictions.
The previous experiment
Each session was organized as follows:
At the end of the experiment, each player A was anonymously and randomly matched with a player B. The outcome of the game for each pair of players was determined by the decisions made by both players following player B's speech: Instructions for the remaining parts will be provided later.
Part 1
First, computer software will randomly choose a player B who participated in the previous experiment, as described above. Your task is to predict if that player decided to roll a die or not in the previous experiment. Your gain will depend on the accuracy of your prediction:
• you will earn 100 points for a correct prediction • you will earn 20 points for an incorrect prediction.
1 point is worth 0.10 euro.
Your prediction may be made in one of the four contexts: 36 • prior to making a prediction, you will be given the opportunity to see a picture showing the player B. The picture was taken privately and independently of the previous experiment;
• prior to making a prediction, you will be given the opportunity to watch a short video recording (with the sound on) showing the player B. The recording was made privately and independently of the previous experiment. It presentes the player reading a paragraph of a printer instruction manual;
• prior to making a prediction, you will be given the opportunity to watch a short video recording (with the sound on) showing the player B while making a statement in front of player As in the previous experiment, as described above;
• before making the prediction, you will not receive any information about the player B from the previous experiment.
For each of these contexts, you will be rst asked to indicate an amount (denoted M) between 21 and 100 points. This amount should make you indierent between receiving M for sure (and without the need to predict player B's choice) and making a prediction about player B's choice which, depending on the accuracy of your prediction, may earn you either 100 points (for a correct prediction) or 20 points (for an incorrect prediction).
Then, one of the contexts will be chosen at random by the computer software. For this particular context, the computer will then randomly generate a number between 20 and 99 (denoted N), all values within this range being equally probable.
If M ≤ N (that is, if the amount you have chosen for the randomly selected context is smaller than or equal to the random number N generated by the computer), then you will receive a certain payo of N × 0.10 euro and will not make a prediction in the context randomly selected by the computer. If this context contains a video or a photo of the player B, you will still have the opportunity to inspect its content.
If M > N (that is, if the amount you have chosen for the randomly selected context is greater than the random number N generated by the computer), then you will make a prediction in the context randomly selected by the computer and your gain will depend on the accuracy of your 37 prediction: you will earn 100 points (10 euros) for a correct prediction or 20 points (2 euros) for an incorrect prediction.
Here are some examples illustrating this procedure: Example 1. If the amount M you chose for the context randomly selected by the computer equals 32, and the randomly generated number N equals 26, then you will make a prediction in the context selected by the computer. Example 2. If the amount M you chose for the context randomly selected by the computer equals 37, and the randomly generated number N equals 76, then your gain will be equal to 7.60 euros (76 × 0.10 euro) and you will not be asked to make a prediction in the context selected by the computer.
Example 3. If the amount M you chose for the context randomly selected by the computer equals 81, and the randomly generated number N equals 81, then your gain will be equal to 8.10 euros (81 × 0.10 euro) and you will not be asked to make a prediction in the context selected by the computer.
Part 2
Before the random draw, we would like to ask you to perform an extra task allowing you to earn money. Its rules are outlined below.
Previously, we have conducted additional experimental sessions in which participants were asked to guess the decisions made by player Bs in the experimental game. Each participant in those previous experiments made multiple predictions in one (and only one) of the three contexts you have seen before:
• either the following context: prior to making a prediction, they were given the opportunity to watch a short video recording (with the sound on) showing the player B while making a statement in front of player As in the previous experiment, as described above ;
• or the following context: prior to making a prediction, they were given the opportunity to watch a short video recording (with the sound on) showing the player B. The recording was made privately and independently of the previous experiment. It presentes the player reading a paragraph of a printer instruction manual ;
• or the following context: prior to making a prediction, they were given the opportunity to see a picture showing the player B. The picture was taken privately and independently of the previous experiment ;
For each of those contexts, we have calculated the average rate of correct predictions, i.e. how many predictions in 100 were correct on average.
For each of the three contexts, you will be asked to guess that average rate of correct predictions.
You will choose a number between 0 and 100, as well as ONE of the following intervals: ±5, ±10,
±15.
Your answer is correct whenever the dierence between the average rate of correct predictions observed in the previous experiment and the number you have stated lies within the interval you have chosen. For interval ±5, this dierence cannot be greater than 5 in either direction. For intervals ±10 or ±15, this dierence cannot exceed 10 or 15 (respectively) in either direction.
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In order to earn money, you need to provide corrects answers in all three contexts.
The amount you will earn may also vary depending on the chosen intervals. You earn 10 euros by providing three corrects answers with intervals ±5. Each time you choose an interval ±10, this amount will decrease by 1.50 euros. If you choose ±15, instead, it will decrease by 3 euros. 
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